

## Message Text

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ACTION ARA-06

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 NSC-05 NSCE-00 DODE-00 SP-02 L-01

INR-05 CIAE-00 IO-03 /037 W

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P 302252Z JUN 75

FM AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3779

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 SANTIAGO 4600

LIMDIS

DEPT PASS DOD

FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROGERS FROM POPPER

R.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MASS, CI, US

SUBJECT: PINOCHET PRESSES FOR URGENT DECISION ON FMS CREDITS FOR CHILE

1. SUMMARY: COMPLAINING THAT CHIEF OF GOC MILITARY MISSION IN WASHINGTON CANNOT GET STRAIGHT ANSWERS FROM DOD ON WHETHER CHILE CAN SPEND ITS REMAINING 1971-74 FMS MILITARY CREDITS, PRES. PINOCHET WOULD LIKE A YES-OR-NO CLARIFICATION WITH THIRTY DAYS IF POSSIBLE. EXPLAINING URGENCY, PINOCHET'S TOP ARMY AIDES STRESS PERU'S GROWING MILITARY SUPERIORITY, NOW INCREASING WITH US AS WELL AS SOVIET HELP. AMBASSADOR SAYS HE WILL LOOK INTO ALLEGED RUNAROUND RECEIVED BY CHILEAN MILITARY MISSION CHIEF, AND REMINDS GOC OF DIFFICULTIES ENTAILED IN ANY USG MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO CHILE AT THIS TIME. GUIDANCE REQUESTED. END SUMMARY.

2. ON FORTY MINUTES NOTICE, I HAD AN UNUSUAL MEETING AFTERNOON JUNE 30 WITH PRES. PINOCHET, THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE GEN. BRADY, CHIEF OF ARMY GENERAL STAFF GEN. ALVAREZ, AND CHIEF OF NATIONAL DEFENSE STAFF  
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GEN. ARELLANO. WITH ME, BY CHILEAN REQUEST, WERE MILGP

CHIEF COL. GEORGE, MILGP ARMY SECTION CHIEF COL. FISHER, AND ARMA COL. CUMMINGS. MEETING TOOK PLACE NOT IN GOVERNMENT HEADQUARTERS (DIEGO PORTALES BUILDING), BUT IN ARMY COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF'S OFFICE AT MINISTRY OF DEFENSE.

3. WITHOUT PRELIMINARIES, GEN. PINOCHET TOLD ME HE WANTED TO EXPRESS HIS DISPLEASURE (DESAGRADO) WITH THE STATUS OF US MILITARY AID TO CHILE. PRESIDENT SAID CHILEANS HAD NEGOTIATED LONG AND HARD TO ESTABLISH WHERE USG STOOD ON THIS MATTER. HE WAS PARTICULARLY EXERCISED THAT THE CHIEF OF THE CHILEAN MISSION IN WASHINGTON, GEN. MOREL (WHO UNTIL A FEW MONTHS AGO HAD BEEN HIS PERSONAL AIDE AND WHO IS VERY CLOSE TO HIM) HAD BEEN UNABLE TO OBTAIN A SATISFACTORY RESPONSE TO CHILE'S QUESTIONS REGARDING THE AVAILABILITY OF 1971-74 FMS CREDITS WHOSE USE HAD BEEN HELD UP FOR MONTHS BY USG.

4. PINOCHET HOPED HE COULD BE TOLD WITHIN THIRTY DAYS WHETHER USE OF THESE CREDITS WAS POSSIBLE. HE REGARDED THIS AS A MATTER OF HIGHEST IMPORTANCE. ESSENTIAL POINT WAS THAT GOC, UNDER INCREASING PRESSURE BECAUSE OF PERUVIAN PREPARATIONS ON CHILE'S NORTHERN FRONTIER, FELT IT WAS SIMPLY NOT ABLE TO GO ON INDEFINITELY IN PRESENT POSITION OF UNCERTAINTY.

5. DURING CONVERSATION IT BECAME APPARENT THAT WHAT HAD SO IRRITATED PRESIDENT AND HIS TOP ARMY ADVISERS WAS A RECENT MESSAGE FROM GEN. MOREL, FROM WHICH THE PRESIDENT READ TO STRESS THAT MOREL HAD BEEN REPEATEDLY REBUFFED IN HIS EFFORTS TO GET SATISFACTORY RESPONSES TO HIS INQUIRIES FROM THE PENTAGON. PINOCHET INTERPRETED THIS TO MEAN THAT MOREL HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO OBTAIN INTERVIEWS WITH THE PROPER PEOPLE THERE.

6. I TOLD THE PRESIDENT THAT IF GEN. MOREL HAD NOT BEEN PROPERLY RECEIVED IN THE DEFENSE DEPT, THIS WAS REGRETTABLE AND I WOULD DO MY BEST TO HAVE IT CORRECTED IMMEDIATELY. I WOULD ALSO BE GLAD, WHEN I WAS IN WASHINGTON IN JULY, TO URGE UPON ALL THE OFFICIALS CONCERNED THAT STEPS BE TAKEN TO CLARIFY THE POINTS IN DISPUTE AMONG AMERICAN AUTHORITIES  
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AS TO WHAT COULD AND COULD NOT BE DONE WITH RESPECT TO MILITARY AID TO CHILE. BUT THE PRESIDENT MUST BE AWARE OF THE DIFFICULTIES ON OUR SIDE.

7. AT THIS POINT GEN. BRADY WEIGHED IN STRONGLY ON THE SUBJECT OF INCREASING CHILEAN FEARS REGARDING PERU'S GROWING MILITARY SUPERIORITY. HE WENT THROUGH THE LOPSIDED RATIOS BETWEEN THE PERUVIAN TANK AND

ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIER INVENTORIES AND THOSE OF CHILE. SPECIFICALLY, HE SAID CHILEAN INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATED THERE WERE 300-PLUS RUSSIAN T54 AND T55 TANKS, 120 FRENCH AMX13 TANKS AND 40 SHERMAN M41 TANKS IN PERUVIAN HANDS. THE LATTER BALANCED OFF THE 40 SHERMAN TANKS CHILE POSSESSED; ACCORDINGLY, IT MIGHT BE SAID THAT PERU WAS MORE THAN TEN TIMES MORE POWERFUL ON THE GROUND THAN CHILE.

8. IN ADDITION, BRADY CONTINUED, PERU HAD SAM 3 AND SAM 6 MISSILES AS WELL AS IMPORTANT QUANTITIES OF US AND FRENCH 105 AND 155 ARTILLERY. PERU HAD RECENTLY CREATED A NEW ARMORED BRIGADE IN THE SOUTH, USING THE RUSSIAN T55 TANKS AND US-SUPPLIED M113 ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS.

9. BRADY POINTED OUT THAT NOT ONLY WAS THE SOVIET UNION EQUIPPING PERU; SO WAS THE UNITED STATES, IN PARTICULAR WITH THE REPORTED 280 ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS THE PERUVIANS WERE GETTING FROM US. CHILEAN ARMY WAS GETTING VITUALLY NOTHING. WOULD CHILE BE ABSOLUTELY ALONE, HE ASKED, IF AND WHEN THE PERUVIANS DECIDED TO MOVE? IF SO, AND IF CHILE WENT DOWN, IT WOULD BE BECAUSE THE US HAD JOINED THE USSR IN EQUIPPING THE PERUVIANS, AND BECAUSE CHILE'S FRIENDS DID NOT AID IT IN TIME. HE WONDERED WHETHER WE MEANT TO REPEAT THE MISTAKE WE HAD MADE IN PERMITTING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A COMMUNIST GOVERNMENT IN CUBA.

10. GEN. ALVAREZ ASSERTED THAT THE PERUVIANS WERE NOW CONCENTRATING THEIR TANKS NEAR PERU'S SOUTHERN BORDER. CHILEAN ARMY COULD ONLY ASSUME THAT THIS WAS DONE WITH AGGRESSIVE INTENT. GOC BELIEVED THAT PERU HAD 200 RUSSIAN MILITARY ADVISERS IN COUNTRY, THAT THERE WERE OVER 600 CUBANS THERE AS CIVILIAN ADVISERS, AND THAT

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THERE WERE ALSO CZECHS AND OTHER IRON CURTAIN NATIONALS. IF WORST CAME TO WORST, GEN. BRADY ADDED, AND CHILE FOUND ITSELF ALONE, WHAT COULD IT DO? IT MIGHT EVEN HAVE TO LOOK TO MAO TSE-TUNG FOR ASSISTANCE.

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ACTION ARA-06

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 NSC-05 NSCE-00 DODE-00 L-03 IO-03

INR-05 SP-02 CIAE-00 /039 W

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P 302252Z JUN 75

FM AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3780

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 SANTIAGO 4600

LIMDIS

DEPT PASS DOD

FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROGERS FROM POPPER

11. DURING THIS DISCUSSION, BOTH THE PRESIDENT AND GEN. BRADY TOOK PAINS TO DISTINGUISH THE POSITION OF THE US ON ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE FROM SITUATION AS REGARDS MILITARY AID.

12. AFTER SOME 20 MINUTES OF THIS LINE OF DISCUSSION, AAS PRESIDENT MOVED TO TERMINATE MEETING, I AGAIN REMINDED HIM THAT HE MUST BE AWARE OF DIFFICULTIES CONFRONTING USG IN SEEKING TO STRENGTHEN CHILE'S MILITARY FORCES. WE HAD REPEATEDLY DISCUSSED OBSTACLES TO US ASSISTANCE POSED BY CHILE'S HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEMS.

13. PRESIDENT REPLIED WITH SOME IMPATIENCE. ASKED WHAT CHILE COULD DO IN FACE OF COMMUNIST-DIRECTED EXPLOITATION OF THIS SUBJECT. SAID CHILE HAD AGREED TO RECEIVE UN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION STUDY GROUP CONSISTING OF FIVE REPRESENTATIVES DRAWN FROM NON-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES. NOW, HOWEVER, GOC LEARNED THAT THEY WOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY A UN SECRETARIAT STAFF OF 15 OF WHOM 8 OR 9 WERE MARXISTS. HOW, HE ASKED, COULD THE COMMISSION BE EXPECTED TO GET AN UNBIASED PICTURE IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES?

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14. I TOLD PRESIDENT AS MEETING CLOSED THAT I WOULD OF COURSE GO INTO MILITARY ASSISTANCE MATTERS THOROUGHLY WHEN I WAS IN WASHINGTON AND WOULD HAVE A RESPONSE FOR HIM AS PROMPTLY AS POSSIBLE.

15. COMMENT: IN MY EXPERIENCE HERE, THIS EMOTIONAL PERFORMANCE IS ALMOST UNIQUE. I BELIEVE IT OCCURRED BECAUSE JOREL'S MESSAGE SEEMED TO THE CHILEANS TO REFLECT AN AFFRONT TO CHILEAN PRIDE. I HOPE USG WILL UNDERSTAND THAT STRONG GOC DEMARCHE IS CLEARLY FRUIT OF MONTHS OF GROWING FRUSTRATION, AND WILL CONSIDER CHILEAN COMPLAINTS PROMPTLY ON THEIR MERITS.

16. CHILEANS DESERVE AN ANSWER ON WHETHER AND HOW THEY MAY USE BACK FMS CREDITS; ON WHETHER THEY MAY OBTAIN THOSE ITEMS OF ANCILLARY EQUIPMENT SUCH AS SIDEWINDERS AND DESTROYER PARTS WHICH THEY NEED TO MAKE NEW MATERIAL ACQUIRED OR BEING ACQUIRED FULLY SERVICEABLE; AND WHETHER NEW PURCHASES FOR CASH ARE OR ARE NOT EXCLUDED. CASH BEING SCARCE HERE AT THIS JUNCTURE, FMS CREDITS THEY HAVE BEEN STORING UP FOR USE IN ACQUIRING TANKS AND TOW'S ARE UPPERMOST IN THEIR MINDS. OUR SCANTY INFORMATION INDICATES THESE CREDITS MAY TOTAL ALMOST ELEVEN MILION DOLLARS.

17. ASIDE FROM THE PRESIDENT'S PIQUE OVER THE ALLEGED TREATMENT OF GEN. MOREL, COMMENTS MADE TODAY REFLECT ONE OF THE PERIODIC CHILEAN UPSWINGS OF CONCERN WITH RESPECT TO PERUVIAN INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITIES. FOR THE LAST 6 TO 8 MONTHS, CHILEAN ARMY LEADERS HAVE HELD THE VIEW THAT PERU'S INTERNAL PROBLEMS AND STATE OF MILITARY PREPARATION WOULD SERVE TO DISCOURAGE ANY IMMEDIATE TENDENCY TO ATTACK CHILE. WE ESTIMATE THAT THEY NOW FEEL THE SITUATION IS CHANGING, AND THAT EVENTUALLY THE PERUVIANS, WITH THEIR ENORMOUS MILITARY ADVANTAGE ON THE GROUND, MAY FEEL THEMSELVES IN A POSITION TO STRIKE. OUR POLICY OF EVEN-HANDEDNESS IN MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO PERU AND CHILE, WHICH WAS DESIGNED TO ESTABLISH SOME MINIMAL APPROACH TO A BALANCE OF FORCES AND THUS TO HELP DETER ANY ACTIVE AGGRESSION, HAS GONE BY THE BOARDS BECAUSE OF CONGRESSIONAL CONCERNS OVER HUMAN RIGHTS. I BELIEVE IT IS IN GENERAL US INTEREST TO MAINTAIN STABILITY ON THE SOUTH AMERICAN  
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CONTINENT, FROM BOTH STRATEGIC AND IDEOLOGICAL STANDPOINTS. HOPE TO EXPLORE THIS SUBJECT THOROUGHLY WHILE I AM IN WASHINGTON.

18. I RECOMMEND I BE AUTHORIZED TO INFORM PRESIDENT ASAP THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO INTENTION TO SLIGHT GEN. MOREL OR TO AVOID DISCUSSION, AND THAT WE MAY ASSURE GOC MOREL WILL BE SATISFACTORILY RECEIVED IN DOD. FURTHER, WITH RESPECT TO FMS CREDITS, I HOPE I MAY HAVE A DEFINITE YES-OR-NO ANSWER, WITH FACTUAL MATERIAL AND EXPLANATION OF STATUS, IF POSSIBLE BEFORE THE END OF THIS WEEK WHEN I AM LEAVING FOR WASHINGTON. IN ANY EVENT, I HOPE THAT

DURING MY STAY IN WASHINGTON I CAN REVIEW ENTIRE MATTER  
OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO GOC AS BASIS FOR FURTHER  
DISCUSSIONS ON MY RETURN TO SANTIAGO.

19. CHIEF MILGP, DATT AND ARMA HAVE SEEN THIS MESSAGE  
AND CONCUR WITH RECOMMENDATIONS.  
POPPER

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## Message Attributes

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